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exhaustion of state remedies before federal injunctive or declaratory
relief could be obtained, a requirement which has been explicitly
rejected in other circumstances. 52
In Salem Inn, the Second Circuit resolved an issue left unanswered
by the Supreme Court in Younger. By ruling that federal injunctive
relief was proper where a state criminal proceeding was initiated subse-
quent to the commencement of the federal action, the court moved
away from a strict interpretation of Younger and, instead, reaffirmed
the important role federal courts should play in protecting constitu-
tional rights. While the majority may have precipitated a race to the
courthouses, far more importantly it insured that the federal courts
will remain, in most instances, the prime protectors of federal rights.53
Stephen Fox
STANDARD ESTABLISHED FOR PRECLUDING PENDENT JURISDICTION
Kavit v. A. L. Stamm & Co.
Article III of the Constitution extends the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to cases "arising under" the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States.' Where a case presents a jurisdic-
tionally sufficient federal question, access to the federal forum will also
be available for all related claims, including those of a non-federal
nature. This result is achieved through the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction, whereby the federal courts may assert judicial power over state
law questions which must be determined in order to resolve the primary
federal claim.2 Pendent jurisdiction will attach where the state and
cation that the bar's management acted contrary to good faith. When the ordinance became
effective, the dancers were immediately clothed. After a few weeks, finding itself threatened
with financial ruin, M & L Rest instituted the federal action. It would be unjust to deny
a speedy resolution by allowing the town to "oust" the federal court of its jurisdiction
merely by bringing criminal proceedings.
52 See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963), which expressly re-
jected this approach in suits involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
53 The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari. 43 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 21,
1975) (No. 74-337). Hopefully, the Court will confirm the Second Circuit's interpretation
of Younger.
1 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The constitutional provision has been implemented by
§ 1331(a) of the Federal Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Congress has added a
requirement that the amount in controversy must exceed $10,000. Id. For a thorough
discussion of the difficulties in ascertaining whether or not a claim arises under federal
law, see Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890 (1967).
2 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
In Osborn, legislation creating the Bank of the United States authorized the Bank
to sue or be sued in any federal circuit court. The statute, however, did not limit the
authorization to suits involving federal questions. Id. at 817. It was contended that Con-
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federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"3 and
"the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
'case.' ",4
Although a basic understanding of the concept is not inherently
difficult, the development of workable standards for its implementation
has proven troublesome. 5 Particularly vexing is the situation where the
federal claim is merely colorable and asserted only to ensure that a
federal forum will hear the predominant state claim. In an attempt to
alleviate this problem, Judge Friendly, writing for a unanimous Second
Circuit panel in Kavit v. A. L. Stamm & Co.,6 promulgated a new stan-
dard:
If it appears that the federal claims are subject to dismissal [for
failure to state a claim] or could be disposed of on a motion for
summary judgment ... , the court should refrain from exercising
pendent jurisdiction absent exceptional circumstances.7
If the district court determines at the outset that the federal claims are
too "flimsy," pendent jurisdiction should not be invoked.s Thus, Kavit
suggests that even though a federal claim is sufficiently substantial to
provide subject matter jurisdiction, it may not be substantial enough
to confer pendent jurisdiction over a related state claim. 9
The plaintiff, Dr. Arthur Kavit, maintained an account with the
brokerage firm of Stamm & Co.10 In 1964, through Stamm and its regis-
tered representative, Jack Levien, Kavit made two short sales of Texas
gress could not grant federal jurisdiction over cases brought by or against the Bank that
derived from general common law principles. Id. at 819. Chief Justice Marshall, writing
for the Supreme Court, rejected this contention, stating:
[Wjhen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Con-
gress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other ques-
tions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823 (emphasis added). See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine
of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. Rav. 1018 (1962).
3 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
4 Id. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAxv. L. RIv. 657, 658
(1968).
5 See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdic-
tion in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1018 (1962).
6491 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1974).
7Id. at 1180, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
8491 F.2d at 1179.
9 The federal courts have recognized that a purported federal claim might be so thin
as to be insubstantial for purposes of sustaining subject matter jurisdiction. Levering &
Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); Elberti v. Kunsman, 376 F.2d 567 (3d
Cir. 1967) (per curiam). Jurisdictional insubstantiality could result in cases where the
claim is "obviously without merit" or prior decisions have so foreclosed the issue as to
render the claim frivolous. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933); Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105-06 (1933).
10491 F.2d at 1180.
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Gulf Sulphur Co. stock. Unfortunately for Kavit, the price of the stock
increased sharply. The short sales were covered at a substantially higher
price, resulting in a loss to Kavit of $3,602.26." Subsequently, Kavit
brought an action in federal district court against both Stamm and
Levien. The complaint stated two claims based on alleged violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 Specifically, the plaintiff
maintained that defendants had committed a fraud in the purchase and
sale of securities in violation of section 10(b) of the Act and rule lOb-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,' and that the Act's margin
requirements had been violated.14 In addition, two common law
grounds were set forth: one charged the defendants with negligence,
the other alleged a conversion.' 5
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim under the Act'6 and, alternatively, for a stay of all court
proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause in the standard customer
contract.'7 District Judge Metzner, while conceding that the allegations
of securities fraud were "thin," ruled that the requisite elements of a
11Id. at 1180-81. News of a mineral strike by Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. caused a sharp
rise in the price of its stock. Kavit decided to sell short when he became convinced that
the value of the stock would not increase any further. Two short sales of 100 shares were
made, one at 42V8 and the other at 39%. Kavit's prediction turned out to be erroneous,
and the short sales were covered at 583/4 per share. Id.
12 Id. The federal district courts have been given exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over cases involving violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). See also Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
627 (1963). Kavit contended that Levien had made reckless forecasts as to the future value
of Texas Gulf stock. It was also alleged that one of the two short sales was made without
Kavit's consent. 491 F.2d at 1181.
14 491 F.2d at 1181. Section 7 of the Act authorizes the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to prescribe regulations as to the amount of credit that can be
extended on any security purchase. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970). Section 29 provides that any
contract made in violation of the Act is void. Id. § 78cc(b). Kavit asserted that during
the period embracing the relevant transactions, his account was substantially under-
margined in violation of section 7, and thus, the sales and purchases made from the
account were void. 491 F.2d at 1181.
15491 F.2d at 1181. Kavit supported these counts with the same allegations which
supported his lOb-5 claim. See note 13 supra. In addition, he alleged that Levien had
failed to comply with Kavit's instructions to cover the sales in the range of 43-44 per
share in the event the price of shares went up. 491 F.2d at 1181.
16491 F.2d at 1181. Kavit urged that, even if pendent jurisdiction were thus in-
applicable, the federal court should nevertheless adjudicate his state law caims because
of the diverse citizenship of the parties. Kavit was a citizen of Virginia and both defen-
dants were citizens of New York. However, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount of $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The Second
Circuit agreed with the defendants, stating that it appeared "'to a legal certainty' that
plaintiff's claim was 'really less' than the required jurisdictional amount." 491 F.2d at
1179, n.3, citing Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
17491 F.2d at 1181. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1970); FE. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3). The
arbitration clause provided that "[a]ny controversy between you [the broker] and the
undersigned [customer] arising out . . . of this contract or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration .... 491 F.2d at 1178 n.2.
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rule lOb-5 violation had been sufficiently asserted.:" Subsequently, the
district court refused to grant the requested stay on the ground that
an arbitration clause could not bind the plaintiff to arbitrate a lob-5
claim.19 After a trial on the merits, District Judge Bonsal, who heard
the case without a jury, determined that the securities law claims were
unfounded.20 Nonetheless, exercising pendent jursidiction over the
state common law claims, he awarded $2,949.08 in damages to Kavit
based on Levien's failure to follow Kavit's instructions to cover the
short sales within a given price range in the event the price increased.
21
Thus, the action, which had been "knocking around" the federal courts
since 1966,22 resulted in a judgment for a relatively minor sum,
grounded entirely in state common law.
On appeal, the Second Circuit, although expressing its disagree-
ment with the assertion of jurisdiction over the state law claims, de-
clined to reverse the judgment.23 Judge Friendly found the case to be a
disturbing abuse of pendent jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction had been
asserted over an essentially state law claim that would otherwise have
gone to arbitration.2 4 Furthermore, the judge expressed dismay that
such a nominal common law claim had consumed a large and undue
18491 F.2d at 1181; see Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., Civil No. 66-1775 (S.D.N.Y.,
Apr. 3, 1957). Judge Metzner relied on A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1967). The Brod court ruled that a plaintiff asserting a lob-5 claim need not prove in
his complaint that he will ultimately recover in order to state a claim sufficient for
jurisdictional purposes. 375 F.2d at 398.
19491 F.2d at 1181. Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that any
provision binding any person to waive compliance with the requirements of the Act or
rules promulgated pursuant to the Act is void. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970). The Supreme
Court has held that a similar statute contained in the Securities Act of 1933 voids any
agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising under the 1933 Act. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 434-35, 438 (1953). Judge Metzner had previously applied the holding of Wilko to
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act in Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898,
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). However, the Pawgan court refused to apply the non-waiver provi-
sions of section 29(a) to pendent state claims, thereby rendering the state claims arbitrable.
The Kavit defendants, by contrast, did not make a motion limited to arbitration solely
of state claims. 491 F.2d at 1181.
20491 F.2d at 1183; see Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., Civil No. 66-1775 (S.D.N.Y.,
July 7, 1972).
21491 F.2d at 1183. The judge disbelieved Kavit's testimony that he had not au-
thorized one of the short sales, but credited Kavit's claim that he had given instructions
when to cover the sales. On appeal, Judge Friendly felt Kavit's testimony strained credu-
lity, but was compelled to give "due regard" to the trial court's evaluation of the tes-
timony. Id., citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
22491 F.2d at 1178 n.l. The court noted there had been "unconscionable delays" by
counsel for both sides. Id.
231d. at 1183-84.
24Id. at 1178. Judge Friendly stated:
Permitting a plaintiff to try such claims on the basis of pendent jurisdiction not
only adds to the burdens of the federal courts and deprives the parties of the op-
portunity to obtain in a more fitting tribunal "a surer-footed reading of applicable
law,"... but it strips the defendant of its contractual right to arbitration.
Id. at 1178-79, quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
1975]
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quantity of scarce federal judicial resources. In particular, the court
was distressed by the "flimsy nature" of the federal grounds used to
support pendent jurisdiction. 25 The federal claims were extremely weak
and "should have been dismissed on motion."26 Nonetheless, the dis-
trict court had permitted the claims to be brought to trial. Since a
reversal for want of jurisdiction would completely destroy the value
of the not insubstantial efforts of the district judges, the Second Circuit
felt compelled to affirm the judgment, albeit "without enthusiasm. " 27
In Kavit, Judge Friendly, adopting a narrow construction of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,28 the leading case concerning pendent
jurisdiction, declared that the weakness of the federal claims may call
for dismissal of the charges grounded on state law.29 In Gibbs, the
Supreme Court had recognized that the federal courts have a broad
constitutional power to exercise jurisdiction over state law causes of
action so closely related to an asserted federal claim as to comprise "one
constitutional case." 30 While so holding, Justice Brennan stated:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court .... The state and federal claims
must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, con-
sidered without regard to their federal or state character, a plain-
tiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality
of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole.31
25 491 F.2d at 1179, citing McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adiley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). In McFaddin, the court affirmed a refusal
to entertain jurisdiction over pendent state law grounds after the federal causes of action
had been dismissed for failure to state a claim. But see Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,
996 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in note 52 infra.
26491 F.2d at 1178.
271d. at 1183-84; see note 47 and accompanying text inIra.
28 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Paul Gibbs alleged that the union had conducted a secondary
boycott prohibited by section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1970), and had conspired against him in violation of Tennessee state law. Id. at
720. The trial court permitted a recovery on the state claim only. The Supreme Court
affirmed notwithstanding the absence of any independent ground for jurisdiction over the
state-based conspiracy claim.
29491 F.2d at 1179.
30 383 U.S. at 725.
31 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This standard is generally read con-
junctively, requiring that the federal and state claims both "derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact" and be the type typically tried "in one judicial proceeding." See
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (2d ed. 1970). But see Baker, Toward a Relaxed
View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 764-65 (1972),
wherein the author suggests that the element of expectation was intended to be an al-
ternative to the "common nucleus of operative fact test." The author contends that the
expectation requirement "ties the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure, with all their liberal provisions for joinder of claims and parties."
Id. at 765. Thus, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction could be proper even though the
[Vol. 49:323
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The Court characterized the prior case law as "unnecessarily grudg-
ing."32 The primary considerations were held to be those of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. 3 3 Accordingly, the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary,34 each case presenting
two distinct issues: (1) whether the federal court has the power to hear
the state claim and, (2) assuming it does, whether that power ought to
be exercised.35
Kavit represents an attempt to place limits on the liberal exercise
of this discretionary power by drawing from the "cautionary" segment
of the Gibbs opinion.36 Although the general thrust of Gibbs was to
encourage a broader use of pendent jurisdiction,37 the Court did indi-
asserted state claim does not derive from the same "nucleus of operative fact" as the
federal claim. Id. at 764.
It should be noted, however, that the American Law Institute (ALl) has suggested
the more popular cumulative construction of the Gibbs formula in its proposed revision
of the federal question jurisdiction statute. ALI, STUDy OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICnON
BErwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs, proposed § 1313(a) and comment at 210 (1969).
32 383 U.S. at 725. The Court set aside the test previously established in Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). In Hurn, pendent jurisdiction was said to exist in "a case
where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only
of which presents a federal question .... " Id. at 246. However, the federal courts would
not have jurisdiction where two separate causes of action were alleged and only one arose
under federal law. Id. The Gibbs Court rejected this test because of the confusion gener-
ated by attempts to determine when "a single cause of action" was present, as opposed
to "two separate and distinct causes of action." 383 U.S. at 722, 724. For some examples
of the difficulties in applying this standard, see Note, The Evolution and Scope of the
Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REy. 1018, 1026-30
(1962).
33 383 U.S. at 726. Other relevant considerations include the desire to avoid needless
rulings on state law issues, whether the state claims are "closely tied" to the federal
grounds, and the likelihood of confusing the jury with presentations of conflicting legal
theories. Id. at 726-27. See Note, UIW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 657, 658 (1968).
34 383 U.S. at 726.
35 Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormadynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809
(2d Cir. 1971).
30 491 F.2d at 1179-80. In Gibbs, Justice Brennan declared:
[R]ecognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancillary questions of
state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon
it what is in effect only a state law case. Once it appears that a state claim con-
stitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,
the state claim may fairly be dismissed.
983 U.S. at 727.
37 For examples of the liberalized approach fostered by Gibbs, see Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 402-05 (1970) (jurisdiction over pendent state claim upheld even though
federal claim had been mooted before trial); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.,
452 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1971) (pendent jurisdiction affirmed although federal claim
dismissed after trial).
The Kavit court itself indicated that the Second Circuit had not been "grudging" in
applying the Gibbs principles. 491 F.2d at 1179. See, e-g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d
1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormadynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1971).
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cate that if the federal claims were dismissed before trial, the state
claims should also be dismissed.18 Kavit moved a step further by adding
that if the federal claims could not withstand a motion for summary
judgment, pendent jurisdiction should not be exercised over any state
causes of action.89
The commentators have also argued that Gibbs loosened the strictures on the appli-
cation of pendent jurisdiction. See C. WRIGr, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (2d ed. 1970);
Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 759 (1972); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAIv. L. REV.
657 (1968). But see Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20
STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968), wherein the author suggests that the broad exercise of pendent
jurisdiction fostered by Gibbs unnecessarily encroaches on state court jurisdiction. Id. at
285.
38 383 U.S. at 726. The Court stated, "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dis-
missed as well." 383 U.S. at 726 (footnote omitted). In Kavit, Judge Friendly interpreted
this language as being "mandatory" in nature. 491 F.2d at 1179. However, the Supreme
Court has indicated that the Gibbs language might not be obligatory. In Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, (1970), the Court refused to consider
[w]hether or not the view that an insubstantial federal question does not confer
jurisdiction-a maxim more ancient than analytically sound--should now be held
to mean that a district court should be considered without discretion, as opposed
to power, to hear a pendent claim ....
Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
The Sixth Circuit, in Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lur's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1973), stated that where the federal issues were dismissed before trial, a district
court decision to decline jurisdiction was "proper." Id. at 395-96. However, the language
of the court could be interpreted as either denying the existence of jurisdictional power
or as affirming the district court's use of discretion to decline utilizing the power.
In a case that arose prior to Gibbs, Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit wrote that
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), see note 32 supra, did not require that "state claims
which are, at best, dubious on their face" be retained after the federal claim is dismissed
on the pleadings. Robinson v. Stanley Home Products, Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir.
1959). However, the validity of this statement may be questioned in light of the liberaliz-
ing effect of Gibbs and the disparaging reference in Gibbs to prior case law. See 383
U.S. at 725.
The ALI study reports:
[i]f the federal element that is the basis for jurisdiction is disposed of early in
the case, as on the pleadings, it smacks of the tail wagging the dog to continue
with a federal hearing of the state claim.
ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICrION BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
proposed § 1313(c), commentary at 213 (1969). However, the ALl proposes a pendent
jurisdiction statute which would leave "discretion in the trial judge to refuse to hear the
state claim after dismissal of the federal claims where judicial economy would not be
served by entertaining the non-federal claim." Id. Thus, the ALl study leans away from
the mandatory approach suggested in Kavit.
39491 F.2d at 1180. The court would exempt "exceptional circumstances" from the
application of the general rule. Id. Three sets of such circumstances were suggested. Id.
at 1180 n.4. Pendent jurisdiction might be warranted if a defendant neglects to raise the
issue of the weakness of the federal claim until the court has invested a substantial
amount of time in the case. Id., citing A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp., 389
F.2d 11, 19-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968). Secondly, pendent jurisdiction
might properly attach when the pendent state claim "significantly invokes questions of
federal policy." 491 F.2d at 1180 n.4, citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
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Judge Friendly stated that the securities fraud claim was too "thin"
and did not contain the requisite allegations of fraudulent activities. 40
As to the alleged margin violations, the panel ruled that although the
complaint stated facts sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, subsequent affidavits made it clear that the allegations
would not have withstood a motion for summary judgment.41 Addi-
tionally, the court, sensitive to the presence of the arbitration provision
in the standard customer contract, voiced concern that the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction "stripped" the defendants of their contractual
right to arbitrate.42 The Kavit court indicated that where jurisdiction
(1966), and Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-85 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 944 (1972). Finally, the ourt recognized that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
might be justified if the dismissal of the pendent claims "would otherwise sharply dash
with the directive in Gibbs that pendent jurisdiction serve the ends of 'judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants."' 491 F.2d at 1180 n.4.
40491 F.2d at 1182. Judge Friendly ruled that the complaint could not be rescued
by A.T. Brod 8. Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), relied upon by District Judge
Metzner. 491 F.2d at 1182; see note 18 supra. In Brod, a stockbroker sought compensa-
tion for losses suffered because of the defendants' failure to pay for securities which they
had ordered. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had schemed to defraud various
brokers and dealers by ordering securities and intending to pay for them only if their
market value had increased by the date payment was due. 375 F.2d at 395. The Second
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that federal jurisdiction was lacking. Judge
Kaufman, writing for the court, ruled that the plaintiff was not required to prove in its
complaint that it would ultimately recover. Id. at 398.
The Kavit court distinguished Brod, noting that the plaintiff in Brod had at least
alleged fraud in the traditional sense, even though it was doubtful it would recover. In
Kavit, the complaint failed to aver that Levien did not sincerely believe the predictions
he allegedly made, nor did Kavit aver that no reasonable man would have so believedL
491 F.2d at 1182.
41491 F.2d at 1182. The affidavits showed that with one technical and excusable ex-
ception Kavit's account was adequately margined during the period in issue. During this
period, Kavit was in the process of having his account transferred to Staumm from the
Richmond, Va. office of Francis I. Dupont & Co. Id. at 1180. The court concluded
that during the period of transfer of plaintiff's account, Staum, as transferee, had per-
missibly treated the two accounts as one under § 6(d) of the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation T. 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(d)(1) (1974). This regulation provides that, "[i]n the
event of the transfer of a general account.., from one creditor to another, such account
may be treated for the purposes of this part as if it had been maintained by the transferee
from the date of its origin ... ." Id.
Secondly, even though it was apparently conceded by defendants that there were vio-
lations with respect to specific transactions, the court agreed that they were excusable.
The court noted that §§ 3(b) and 3(g) of Regulation T permit "'day-light trades': fluc-
tuations in the customer's balance that would otherwise result in an insufficient margin
... if the customer is left with sufficient margin in his account at the end of the day."
491 F2d at 1182, citing 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(b), (g) (1974).
In addition, the court pointed out that while at one point Kavit's account was under-
margined by $36, § 6(k) of Regulation T forgives "innocent mistakes" where, after its
discovery, the broker takes practicable action to rectify the mistake. 12 C.F.R. 220.6(k)
(1974). Thus, the Second Circuit would have awarded summary judgment to the defen-
dants on the federal claims. 491 F.2d at 1182.
42491 F.2d at 1178-79.
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over otherwise arbitrable state claims is only pendent, the district court
should normally dismiss the state claims or stay their trial.43
Despite affirmance of the district court's decision, the Second Cir-
cuit clearly believed that pendent jurisdiction had been improperly
exercised.4 4 Judge Friendly went so far as to indicate that an appeal
from Judge Metzner's interlocutory orders denying the motions to
dismiss or stay the state claims would have led to a reversal.45 However,
since the interlocutory appeal was not perfected 6 and the case did not
reach the appellate level until after trial on the merits, the court felt
compelled to affirm the judgment. The case had run its full course
through the federal courts, the amount in controversy was minor, and
the defendants had failed to protect their right to arbitrate by taking an
earlier appeal.4 7 The court also noted that reversals for improper
exercise of pendent jurisdiction are "very rare."48 Indeed, other circuits
43 Id. at 1180. Moreover, while the court indicated a willingness to make an exception
in light of special circumstances, it could not think of any circumstances that would
apply. Id.
44Id. at 1182-83.
45Id. at 1182.
46MId. at 1183. The defendants filed notices of appeal, but failed to pursue them.
Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed for lack of prosecution. Id. at 1181. The defen-
dants claimed on the instant appeal that no interlocutory appeal was possible inasmuch
as the order denying the motion for a stay pending arbitration was not final. Thus, they
contended their right to appeal had not been lost. The Second Circuit rejected this
contention, stating that "the denial of a stay pending arbitration in an action at law has
long been held appealable .... " Id. at 1181-82. See Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
317 U.S. 188 (1942); Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S.
449, 452 (1935) (Brandeis, J.); Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
Professor Moore has stated that the rule laid down in Enelow and Ettelson provides
that "[c]ertain orders that do no more than determine the method or timing of trial have
nevertheless been held to be 'orders . . . granting . . . or . . . refusing . . . injunctions'
within the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and thus appealable." 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRaaricu 1110.20[3] (2d ed. 1970). Under this theory, orders granting or denying stays of
district court proceedings may be appealed if the action to be stayed is one at law and
if the stay is requested in order to permit the prior determination of an equitable defense
or counterclaim. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 308 (2d
Cir. 1967) (Kaufman, J.).
47491 F.2d at 1183-84. The court's refusal to void the work of the trial court is
supported by Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971). The
Seventh Circuit therein stated:
"Considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" cer-
tainly favor the retention of jurisdiction over state law issues, where both state
and, federal claims were tried together and the latter only dismissed after trial.
Id. at 629, quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
The defendant contended that an arbitrator familiar with the practices of the se-
curities industry would have reached a different conclusion than did Judge Bonsai. The
Second Circuit responded by pointing out that the defendants should have protected
their right to arbitrate the state claims by appealing Judge Metzner's orders or by moving
the federal court to dispose of the federal claims only. 491 F.2d at 1183.
48491 F.2d at 1180 n.5, citing Brough v. United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748 (Ist Cir.
1971) (exercise of pendent jurisdiction was inappropriate in action where no federal
wrong was alleged in the complaint but which was removed to federal court by defendant
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have permitted liberal exercise of pendent jurisdiction even in situa-
tions where the federal claims are resolved before trial."'
In formulating its own test by which to measure the propriety of
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, the Second Circuit made an im-
plicit shift away from the considerations of fairness and judicial econ-
omy emphasized in Gibbs.50 Rather, the Kavit court preferred to gauge
the thinness or flimsiness of the federal claim. The court was concerned
with ascertaining whether the plaintiff has a federal claim truly worthy
of vindication in a federal forum.51 This shift in emphasis seemingly
who alleged the action arose under federal law) and Elberti v. Kunsman, 376 F.2d 567,
568 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (retention of jurisdiction over state claim was inappropriate
where complaint itself revealed that federal claim was "unsubstantial and frivolous').
Elberti, however, can be distinguished from Kavit. In Elberti, there was no federal
claim to support jurisdiction over the pendent state claim. In Kavit, the Second Circuit
was concerned not with federal claims which are insubstantial to support their own
jurisdiction, but rather with federal claims which are insubstantial to support pendent
jurisdiction. See 491 F.2d at 1179.
.Brough, however, was somewhat analogous to the problem to which the Second Cir-
cuit had addressed itself. In Brough, the First Circuit confronted an action which had
originally been commenced in a state court and removed to the district court. As the
court pointed out, the removal was originally inappropriate because the plaintiff's com-
plaint only contained an allegation of common law negligence. This defect, however, was
later waived when, after the district court refused to remand the case, the plaintiff added
a second count based on federal law. The district court then granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment as to both the state and federal claim.
Facing the appeal from summary judgment, the court pointed out that in removal
cases, as in original federal jurisdiction cases, the district court may retain pendent:
jurisdiction over the state claim or remand it to the state court. 437 F.2d at 750. Citing
Gibbs, the court concluded that the granting of summary judgment on the federal claim
created a situation in which the appropriate exercise of discretion required a remand of
the state claim. Id. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment as to the federal claim,
vacated the judgment as to the state claim, and remanded that claim to the state court.
Id.
It cannot be overlooked, however, that in Brough, the court had an additional im-
petus to remand. Initially, the plaintiff had elected the state court as his forum only to
be frustrated by what should have been an unsuccessful attempt to remove by the defen-
dant.
49 491 F.2d at 1180 n.5, citing Gray v. Local 51, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators &
Asbestos Workers, 447 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir. 1971) (pendent jurisdiction over breach of
contract action by member against union local exercised after actions against the local and
international union for violations of the Federal Labor Management Relations Act were
dismissed). The Kavit court also referred to Springfield Television, Inc. v. Springfield, 462
F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1972), wherein it was held that the district court properly retained
jurisdiction over a pendent state claim notwithstanding the fact that the parties disposed
of the federal preemption issue by stipulation prior to trial. See also Parrent v. Midwest
Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 1972), wherein the court dismissed the federal
claims and indicated that the district court should have done so before trial because the
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Nonetheless, the court held
that the continued retention of jurisdiction over pendent state claims was proper.
50 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
01 See 491 F.2d at 1178-79, 1183. In Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), the court stated:
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is only applicable when the federal court
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
attempts to question the good faith of the plaintiff. If the court finds
that the plaintiff was merely looking for a federal crutch to support
federal jurisdiction over what is an essentially state law claim, pendent
jurisdiction would presumably be denied.
Nonetheless, a "thinness" approach should be utilized as but one
of several factors to be considered in assessing whether, in a given case,
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would be proper.52 Although a
Kavit-type analysis might be fruitful in circumstances where the plain-
tiff's good faith can be questioned, Gibbs remains the controlling Su-
preme Court precedent. Accordingly, the convenience and fairness
factors, cited in Gibbs, present the operative considerations.53 Indeed,
in Rosado v. Wyman, 4 the Court reaffirmed the broad scope which it
accorded the doctrine in Gibbs, noting that the proper exercise of juris-
diction over a pendent claim is not dependent on the survival of the
federal claim through all stages of the litigation.55
has jurisdiction of a substantial claim to begin with; and the policy is that of
avoiding piecemeal litigation.
Id. at 794.
52 Indeed, the Second Circuit's own position is not entirely consistent. In Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), decided only four months before Kavit, plaintiff
filed suit in state court alleging malicious prosecution on the part of Mrs. Onassis and
the Secret Service agents assigned to protect her. The case was removed to federal court.
The actions against the agents were dismissed because the court found them to be im-
mune from suit. Subsequently, Galella's motion to remand to the state court, made just
prior to trial, was denied. Id. at 991-92.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over the
state claims. Judge Smith, writing for the court, stated that the dismissal of the action
against the agents did not "automatically strip" the court of pendent jurisdiction. The
court noted that the motion to remand was made six months after the dismissal and on
the eve of the trial, that hearings had already been held by the federal court, a special
master had been appointed, a number of motions had been heard, other motions were
pending, and the United States Government had intervened in the case. Judge Smith,
relying on the Gibbs criteria, ruled that
[a]s no claim of unfairness has been raised, considerations of judicial economy
govern and support the court's denial of the motion to remand. A great deal of
judicial effort had been expended in covering ground that must be gone over
anew had remand been ordered.
Id. at 996.
53 383 U.S. at 726; Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormadynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 (2d Cir.
1971).
It should be noted that Judge Friendly would not completely abandon the Gibbs
factors. Instead, he would relegate their role to that of an exception to the Kavit test.
491 F.2d at 1180 n.4; see note 39 supra.
54 397 U.S. 397 (1970). In Rosado, although the federal claim had been mooted, the
Court found it proper for a district court to make a decision on the merits of the pendent
state claim. Id. at 401.
55 Id. at 405. The Court declared:
We are not willing to defeat the commonsense policy of pendent jurisdiction-
the conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litiga-
tion-by a conceptual approach that would require jurisdiction over the primary
claim at all stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim.
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The Second Circuit was undoubtedly influenced by the present
state of congestion in the federal courts. Accordingly, the Kavit test
is designed to ensure that the federal courts are not burdened with cases
properly cognizable by state courts.50 The intimations of the court
should discourage forum-shopping plaintiffs from seeking out federal
causes of action in order to create federal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
application of Kavit to specific cases will present difficulties to the dis-
trict courts. As a practical matter, a court will experience difficulty in
determining when a federal claim is not so "flimsy" as to be denied
jurisdiction, but is "flimsy" enough to fall prey to a motion for sum-
mary judgment. The Kavit opinion offers no suggestions as to what
criteria should be applied in making this determination. Since Kavit
indicates that reversals for improper exercise of pendent jurisdiction
may become more prevalent, district judges may tend to refuse jurisdic-
tion over state claims in close cases. Consequently, Kavit may mark a
return to the more "grudging" approach criticized in Gibbs.57 In ad-
dition, incongruities may develop in cases where the pendent' state
claims are dismissed based upon the "flimsy" nature of the federal claim
but the same "flimsy" allegations are retained for trial. 58
It should be pointed out, however, that Gibbs still requires that the issue as to the
propriety of exercising pendent jurisdiction remain open throughout the litigation. 383
U.S. at 727. The Gibbs court noted that pretrial proceedings or the trial itself could lead
to a conclusion that the state law claims predominate or that the jury would be confused-
conclusions that could not have been anticipated earlier. Id.
Notably, the approach of Rosado is consonant with the liberal rules as to joinder
of claims and parties. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourages the
assertion of counterclaims and cross-claims which arise out of the same "transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim . FE. R. CIv. P.
13(a). It has been said that
[clounterclaim practice has been liberalized to encourage the litigation of all
claims between the parties in one lawsuit and to avoid multiplicity of litigation
with all of its attendant evils-crcuity of action, inconvenience, waste of time
and expense for both the court and the parties, and possible injustice.
Note, The Erie Doctrine and Federal Rule 13(a), 46 MNN. L. R1v. 913, 917 (1962) (foot-
note omitted). This is analogous to what the Supreme Court had in mind in Gibbs when
it spoke of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 583 U.S. at 726.
50 See 491 F.2d at 1178-79.
57 383 U.S. at 725.
58 The Second Circuit has declared:
If it appears that the federal claims are subject to dismissal under F.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) or could be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment under F.R.
Civ.P. 56, the court should refrain from exercising pendent jurisdiction absent
exceptional circumstances.
491 F.2d at 1180.
It must be noted, however, that while the court could, sua sponte, dismiss the state
claim where it "appears that the federal claims ...could" fall prey to a motion for
summary judgment, it could not, on its own motion, grant summary judgment. Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a motion by a party. Thus, in such a.
situation the federal claim would be retained at least until a motion is made and granted.
In addition, even if the motion is made-a likely possibility in most instances-the court
19751
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The difficulties posed by the application of the Kavit rule may lead
the district courts to bypass Kavit in favor of the more tangible criteria
of Gibbs.5 9 However, even if the standards enunciated in Kavit are
cast aside, the district courts in the Second Circuit may be influenced
by the general tenor of the Kavit opinion and be less solicitous towards
requests for pendent jurisdiction. In any event, litigants in these courts
have been put on notice that their pendent state claims will not be
recognized unless the primary federal claim is more than jurisdic-
tionally colorable.
Edgar J. Royce
could, based on evidence adduced for or against the motion, decide that summary judg-
ment would be improper and retain the count for trial. Thus, two trials could result,
one in the state court and one in the federal court. This is quite arguably a result that
taxes the considerations of fairness and judicial economy which were emphasized in
Gibbs. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
59 For a good example of the "real" factors which must be considered in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over claims related to the Securities Exchange Act, see Lowenfels,
Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 CoLuar. L. REV. 474, 492-93 (1967).
